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Abstract   
This essay details the ontological and epistemological bases to discursive institutionalism 
in response to Larsson’s (2015) essay on post-structuralism that condemns discursive 
institutionalism for the ‘sin’ of subjectivism.  The essay offers a friendly rebuttal, 
demonstrating that discursive institutionalism emphasizes the intersubjective nature of 
ideas through its theorization of agents’ “background ideational abilities” and 
“foreground discursive abilities.”  It further argues that discursive institutionalism avoids 
relativism via Wittgenstein’s distinction between experiences of everyday life and 
pictures of the world. The essay ends with a focus on what truly separates post-
structuralism from discursive institutionalism: the theorization of the relationship of 
power to ideas, with discursive institutionalists mainly focused on persuasive power 
through ideas, post-structuralists, on the structural power in ideas or on coercive power 
over ideas.  
 
Keywords:  discursive institutionalism, ideas, discourse, discursive interaction, 
intersubjectivity, ideational power, post-structuralism 
 
It is always a pleasure to be able to engage in discussion about the benefits and 
drawbacks of discursive institutionalism as an analytic framework, and in particular with 
proponents of post-structuralist approaches such as Oscar Larsson, who offers what he 
calls “sympathetic criticism” in his essay published in Critical Review (Larsson 2015).  
 Larsson’s main purpose is to argue that post-structuralism provides special 
insights into “discourse,” understood as the deep structures of meaning that affect ideas 
about politics, and which can blind political agents to the power exercised over them 
regarding who they think they are and what they are doing. He supports this argument in 
two ways. First, he elaborates on the importance of situating individuals’ ideas within the 	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intersubjective, structural contexts that shape their thoughts and behavior, with extensive 
discussion of the works of post-structuralist and constructivist scholars to show that ideas 
are both subjective and intersubjective. Second, he contends that my discursive 
institutionalism “tends to minimize the social and intersubjective aspect of ideas and 
thereby neglects their pregiven, constraining elements” (Larsson 2015, 176).  He 
encapsulates this criticism in the abstract to his article by claiming that discursive 
institutionalism “reduce(s) ideas to properties of individual conscious minds, scanting the 
respects in which ideas are intersubjectively baked into the practices shared by 
individuals” (Larsson 2015, 174). His main purpose is to contend that “we should not 
adopt these frameworks” and instead turn to post-structuralism. 
 These are fighting words in the arena of ideational and discursive scholarship, 
since they suggest that my work falls prey to “subjectivism” and other bad things, which 
justifies abandoning it in favor of post-structuralism. But they are also puzzling words, 
since Larsson’s charges in no way reflect what I actually say, since I too highlight the 
interconnections of the subjective and intersubjective nature of ideas in many different 
works, empirical as well as theoretical.   
Larsson’s misreading of discursive institutionalism rests on three claims: first, as 
already noted, that my work is all about subjectivity rather than intersubjectivity; second, 
that I am wrong to even suggest the possibility of reconciling discursive institutionalism 
with the other neo-institutionalisms; and third, that my take on discourse fails to deal with 
its meaning content, because it is merely about discursive interaction, and Habermasian at 
that (another bad thing?). I will briefly proceed with each of Larsson’s claims in turn, and 
then end with a discussion of what actually does separate discursive institutionalism from 
post-structuralism. This centers on different ways of understanding the nature of power 
and its relationship to ideas, with discursive institutionalists mainly focusing on 
persuasive power through ideas while post-structuralists focus on the structural power in 
ideas and, in some cases, with coercive power over ideas. My overall goal here is to show 
that the post-structuralist approach does indeed diverge on certain points from my own 
but that, ever the reconciler, I find that it can be seen as complementary to rather than 
contradictory with discursive institutionalism.   
 
What Is Discursive Institutionalism? 
But before we begin, a brief sketch of discursive institutionalism is in order. Discursive 
institutionalism has its origins in my desire to give a name to a very rich and diverse set 
of ways of explaining political and social reality that has long been pushed to the margins 
in political science by the growing domination of three older “new institutionalisms”—
rational choice, historical, and sociological. With this naming exercise I seek to call 
attention to the significance of approaches that theorize not only about the substantive 
content of ideas but also about discourse. By discourse, I mean not just its theorization as 
the representation or embodiment of ideas, but the interactive discursive processes by and 
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through which agents generate and communicate ideas. The institutionalism in the name, 
moreover, underlines the importance of considering both ideas and discourse in 
institutional context, by which I mean the meaning context as much as the context of 
formal institutions, informal rules, and everyday practices.  
My purpose in developing what is essentially an umbrella concept for all such 
approaches to ideas and discourse is not simply definitional. It is also constitutive, in that 
it seeks to identify a discursive sphere within which practitioners of these varied 
approaches can discuss, deliberate, and contest one another’s ideas from epistemological, 
ontological, methodological, and empirical vantage-points. As such, there are many 
different possible ontologies and epistemologies as well as methodologies that may fit 
under this larger conceptualization of discursive institutionalism, including my own 
particular approach and, dare I say it, that of Larsson.   
 
The Subjective and Intersubjective Ontology of “Discourse”  
 
The first part of Larsson’s essay reviews the philosophical literature on ideas regarding 
the nature of subjectivity and the importance of intersubjectivity. He begins with a 
snapshot of post-structuralism’s approach to the causal (or structuring) power of ideas, 
illustrating this approach by discussing Judith Butler’s Foucauldianism, which claims that 
ideas and discourses of gender and sex produce the identities they aim to describe, with 
dominant discourses rather than nature naturalizing the differences between genders 
(Larsson 2015, 177). He goes on to consider the constitutive nature of ideas, meaning that 
ideas in many different forms help constitute social and political reality, citing a wide 
range of scholars, including Alexander Wendt, Ian Hacking, and John Searle. This is 
followed by a discussion emphasizing the importance of recognizing that the constitutive 
nature of ideas goes beyond subjectivity (agents’ individual and subjective 
conceptualizations) to intersubjectivity, building on Alan Finlayson, Emanuel Adler, 
Pierre Bourdieu, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Anthony Giddens, Hacking, and 
more. Larsson here argues that intersubjectivity involves the structural and social 
dimension of ideas, meaning ideas that have become accepted by a wider set of actors 
and that take the form of collective knowledge, culture and tradition. Intersubjectivity, 
Larsson continues, does not deny agency, because agents have the potential to both 
reproduce and alter structures as constraints, acting as a force for change by bringing 
concerns to their “discursive consciousness” (citing Giddens) and making tacit or explicit 
choices that break away from the (structuring) ways in which they are classified (citing 
Hacking) (Larsson 2015, 182-83).  He ends by suggesting very briefly that institutions—
both formal, as codified ideas, and informal, as ideational but non-codified—have a “very 
real and material structure” that affects material realities. 
 So far, so good. My own ontological approach to the nature of ideas in discursive 
institutionalism is very close to that discussed by Larsson, as elaborated both in articles to 
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which he refers (i.e., Schmidt 2008, 2010, and 2011a) and in many others to which he did 
not (e.g., Schmidt 2000; 2002, ch. 5; 2006, ch. 5; 2011b; and 2012). It therefore came as 
a surprise when I began to read the second part of Larsson’s essay, where he claims that 
my views about the constitutive nature of ideas agree with his, but that the rest of 
discursive institutionalism does not, because I stop at subjectivity, and close off any 
possibility of intersubjectivity. 
 To disprove that claim, rather than paraphrase my own words, I quote a passage 
from the article on discursive institutionalism to which Larsson refers most, which 
appeared in the Annual Review of Political Science (Schmidt 2008, 314): 
 
[Discursive institutionalism] treats institutions at one and the same time as 
given, as structures which are the context within which agents think, speak, 
and act, and as contingent, as the results of agents’ thoughts, words, and 
actions. As objects of explanation, such institutions are internal rather than 
external to the actors, serving both as structures (of thinking, saying, and 
acting) that constrain actors and as constructs (of thinking, saying, and 
acting) created and changed by those actors. As a result, action in 
institutions, instead of being the product of agents’ rationally calculated, 
path-dependent, or norm-appropriate rule-following, is better seen as the 
process by which agents create and maintain institutions through the use 
of what we will call their “background ideational abilities,” which 
underpin agents’ ability to act within a given meaning context. But it does 
not stop here, because such institutional action can also be predicated upon 
what we will call the “foreground discursive abilities” through which 
agents may change (or maintain) their institutions. This represents the 
logic of communication which is at the basis of agents’ capacity to think, 
speak, and act outside their institutions even as they are inside them, 
enabling them to deliberate about the institutional rules even as they use 
them, and to persuade one another to change those institutions or to 
maintain them. 
 
My use of the term background ideational abilities builds on the work of many of the 
philosophers cited approvingly by Larsson, and clearly demonstrates my concern with the 
intersubjective basis of ideas. In my own elaboration of background ideational abilities, I 
specifically refer to Searle’s (1995, 140-145) conception of “background abilities,” but 
also cite Giddens and Wendt, while noting that I could equally have defined the concept 
using Bourdieu’s “habitus” (with Searle himself noting the similarities) or the later 
Wittgenstein (Schmidt 2008, 315-316; see also 2012, 92-94).   
 But even though I explicitly base my ontology on intersubjectivity, could Larsson 
not still find me guilty of subjectivism, given my reference to the foreground discursive 
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abilities that enable individuals to change or maintain their institutions? The answer is 
that here, too, I am clear about the intersubjectivity involved. Rather than, in Larsson’s 
(2015, 189) words, “overemphasizing the autonomy of agents by relying on individuals’ 
ideas and actions to explain change . . . (which) threatens to deprive us of the ability to 
recognize and explain the existence and continuity of institutions,” I make clear that 
individuals act within the context of ongoing, existing institutions even as they may seek 
to change or to maintain them. Background ideational abilities and foreground discursive 
abilities operate in tandem, with discourse working at both the everyday level of people 
living in continuing institutions (as both structures and constructs) and at a meta-level 
that involves people’s second-order critical communication about what goes on in their 
institutions. This meta-level refers to individuals’ ability to think outside the institutions 
in which they continue to act, to talk about such institutions in a critical way, to 
communicate and deliberate about them, to persuade one another to change their minds 
about their institutions, and then to take collective action to change them (Schmidt 2008, 
316; 2010, 15-16; 2011b).   
 But one might further ask, couldn’t my emphasis on foreground discursive 
abilities, along with the interactive processes of discourse, nonetheless support Larsson’s 
charge that “Schmidt uses ‘discourse’ as essentially equivalent to strategic 
communicative action,” which “has little to do with discourse viewed as a framework of 
meaning” (2015, 190)? Again, Larsson misrepresents my arguments, both because I use 
discourse as a framework of meaning and because discourse understood as an interactive 
process is not simply equivalent to strategic communicative action—although it does 
build on Habermas, among others.   
 As I have stated explicitly time and again, I use the term “discourse” because it 
spans the divide between the substantive content of ideas and the interactive processes of 
discourse through its embodiment of both.2 Notably, not only do I elaborate on the many 
different ways in which ideas are discursively developed, such as through cognitive and 
normative arguments, at different levels of generality, including policies, programs, and 
philosophies, and in many different forms, from frames, stories, and narratives through 
discursive practices and struggles. I also explicitly refer to the benefits of post-
structuralism in exploring the meaning content of discourse in innovative ways, including 
in the seminal work of Laclau and Mouffe (1985) and its application by David Howarth 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 As a side note, using the term discourse in articles and books directed at convincing mainstream political 
science of the value of explanations in terms of ideas and discourse has been tricky business, in particular 
when I first began using making these arguments in the late 1990s and early to mid 2000s (e.g., Schmidt 
2000, 2002, 2006), at a time when discourse was seen by the mainstream as a dangerous word. This should 
help explain my comment about using discourse as a generic term “stripped of post-modernist baggage” 
(Schmidt 2008, 305). This was not meant as a slight to post-modernism or post-structuralism but rather as 
an indication to political scientists of what I intended to do, which was to develop an application of the 
term in a manner different from the way in which it had been used heretofore. My own experience, in 
presentations since the mid-1990s, had also taught me that such a “trigger warning” helped to ensure that 
political scientists might just stop long enough to listen.   
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and co-authors (2000)—although admittedly I don’t mention them in the three articles 
cited by Larsson (but see Schmidt 2011a and 2011b).  
My guess is that part of what Larsson doesn’t like in my Annual Review article 
(Schmidt 2008) is that I move directly from a discussion of the different forms taken by 
ideas and discourse to empirical discussion of examples from a wide range of approaches, 
without explicitly referencing post-structuralism. And he is correct to note that “any 
notion of ‘subjectification,’ reference to identity or identity formation is left out of the 
picture” (Larsson 2015, 190).  But isn’t it possible to discuss the meaning context of 
discourse without limiting it to a post-structuralist definition?   
 Moreover, why is it a problem if, in addition to defining discourse in terms of its 
meaning context, one also discusses it in terms of the interactive processes involved?  
Why is Larsson so intent on insisting that my use of discourse is only about strategic 
communication, and “debate,” which he then claims ensures that the ideas in such 
debates “are primarily regarded as properties of individuals who are disconnected from 
ideational structures and existing discourses” (2015, 190)?  Could it be because he can 
make the case for my approach falling into the “sin” of subjectivism only if he ignores 
my entire discussion of the ontological foundations of discursive institutionalism while 
denying any validity to my (non-post-structuralist) definition of the meaning context of 
discourse?  
 To set the record straight, my discussion of the interactive side of discourse 
assumes the meaning context as a given even as it discusses a wide range of interactive 
discursive processes involving policy actors engaged in a “coordinative” discourse of 
policy construction and political actors engaged with the public in a “communicative” 
discourse of deliberation, contestation, and legitimization (Schmidt 2000, 2002, 2006, 
and 2008). In the coordinative discourse, the agents of change may be individuals acting 
as policy “entrepreneurs” (Kingdon 1984) or “norm entrepreneurs” (Keck and Sikkink 
1998) and/or groups of individuals in discursive communities, whether in loosely 
connected “epistemic communities” that share cognitive and normative ideas about a 
common policy enterprise (Haas 1992); closely connected “advocacy coalitions” that 
share ideas and access to policymaking (Sabatier 1993); “discourse coalitions” that share 
ideas over extended periods of time (Hajer 2003); or expert networks of actors who share 
ideas and technical expertise (Seabrooke and Tsingou 2014). In the communicative 
discourse, political agents generally translate the ideas developed in the coordinative 
discourse into language accessible to the general public. Such agents may be political 
leaders, elected officials, party members, policy makers, spin doctors, and the like who 
act as “political entrepreneurs” as they attempt to form mass public opinion (Zaller 1992) 
or engage the public in debates about the policies they favor (Mutz et al. 1996). Such 
agents also include the media, interest groups acting in the specialized “policy forums” of 
organized interests (e.g., Rein and Schön 1994), public intellectuals, opinion makers, 
social movements, and even ordinary people through their “everyday talk” (Mansbridge 
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1999). The directional arrows of these discursive interactions may be top to top among 
political and/or technical elites, top down through the influence of elites, or bottom up via 
civil society, social-movement activists, or ordinary people. 
 The interactive side of discourse, thus, is a lot more than simply about “strategic 
communication.” It encompasses a wide range of discursive interactions in both policy 
and political spheres that ensure a mix of subjectivity, as individuals are engaged in 
communicative interaction; and intersubjectivity, as their communications and actions are 
naturally based in a given institutional context.  And most importantly, by paying as 
much attention to the interactive side of discourse as the meaning side, I am able to focus 
attention not just on the continuities in such agents” discursive structures but also on the 
dynamics of change (and continuity) in agents” (re)structuring ideas in institutional 
context. 
 
Institutions, Neo-Institutionalisms, and the Epistemology of  
Discursive Institutionalism  
What remains to be explained, therefore, is the nature of the institutional context, and 
whether this must be defined solely in terms of the meaning context of ideational 
structures and discourses (as Larsson insists) or can also be open to the institutional forms 
considered in the other neo-institutionalisms.  
On the question of the constitution of the institutional context, Larsson charges 
discursive institutionalism with being incoherent. For, in its “attempt to reconcile the 
various forms of institutionalism,” it “works from the assumption that objective and 
material interests can both, with the addition of ideas, be included within a single 
analytical framework” (2015, 190). To respond: I define institutional context as the 
meaning context, as discussed above, and do not include objective and material interests 
in discursive institutionalism. But I do maintain openness to the various forms of neo-
institutionalism.   
 By openness, I mean that discursive institutionalists, as scholars of ideas and 
discourse who themselves often come out of and/or engage with one or more of the other 
neo-institutionalist traditions, may use the results of such studies as background 
information or as issues to be debated and investigated (Schmidt 2010). However, I make 
it clear that this does not mean that neo-institutionalists’ assumptions about objectivity or 
material interests can be included in the framework of discursive institutionalism. Much 
the contrary, I discuss at great length the divides in ontology and epistemology between 
more rationalist or materialist-oriented neo-institutionalisms and discursive 
institutionalism. In fact, I insist precisely that “one cannot talk about “objective” interests 
as opposed to ideas because all interests are ideas and because ideas constitute interests, 
such that all interests are “subjective.” Institutions, as the product and subject of ideas, 
cannot constitute (rationalists’) neutral incentive structures (Schmidt 2008, 317).  
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 But this raises a further set of epistemological questions for constructivists with 
regard to what we can know about the world with any certainty. For if everything is 
related to ideas and discourse, with no “neutral incentive structures” or “objective” and 
“material” interests, how can one avoid falling into some sort of extreme idealism or 
relativism, in which one can’t know anything for certain, because the world is radically 
uncertain or even immaterial? The answer is that discursive institutionalism assumes the 
existence of material reality, but it opposes the (rationalist) conflation of material reality 
and interests into “material interests.” Material reality is, rather, the setting within which 
or in response to which agents may conceive of their interests (Schmidt 2008, 2012).   
 But what, then, is material reality or, better, what is “real” even if it is not 
“material”? Searle (1995) is once again useful, in this case for his differentiation between 
“brute facts”—which, like mountains, are material because they exist regardless of 
whether sentient agents acknowledge their existence—and “social facts,” of which 
“institutional facts” are a subset. Institutions are not material because they don’t exist 
without sentient agents, but they are real to the extent that the collective agreements by 
which they were established continue to hold and, like the institution of property or of 
money, are real and have causal effects (Schmidt 2008, 318; 2012, 96-97).   
 To get a clearer sense of how this matters with regard to knowledge and certainty, 
I find illuminating the later Wittgenstein’s little-noticed distinction in On Certainty 
between language-games based on our experience and those based on our pictures of the 
world (Schmidt 2008, 2012). Language-games based in our everyday experiences in the 
world are generally very certain, since they ordinarily admit of no doubts and mistakes—
such as knowledge of one’s own name and address, of the number of one’s hands and 
toes, and of the meanings of the words one uses. By contrast, language-games based in 
our pictures of the world often follow from our (social) scientific interpretations of the 
world—such as belief in the existence of the earth one hundred years ago, in the events of 
history, in the temperature at which water boils, or, say, in the materialist incentives 
structures that determine economic behavior. These always allow for doubts, mistakes, 
and even gestalt switches or radical conversions, even though some such picture-games 
may also allow for much less doubt because they sit at the “foundation” of our picture of 
the world, as part of the very “scaffolding” of our thoughts (Wittgenstein 1972, #s 211, 
234; Schmidt 2008, 318-19, and 2012, 97-100).  
 This distinction between matters that have to do with our experiences of everyday 
life and those involving our pictures of the world suggests that social scientists’ 
explanations have different kinds as well as degrees of certainty, depending on their 
objects of inquiry. In the case of matters close to everyday life, the “facts” about agents’ 
experiences are usually not in dispute (at least until the advent of “post-truth” politics) 
even if the interpretations are, and agreement on the facts is not likely to change radically 
even if there may be some question about which facts to take into account in the 
interpretation of events. By contrast, the “facts” involving agents” pictures of the world, 
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say, deduced through the mathematical models of economists—with their pictures of 
rational actors in the business of rationally calculating their interests in order to maximize 
their utility—can be upended, in particular when the models fail to predict, as in the 
massive financial market crash of 2007-2008 (Schmidt 2012, 98-99). That said, deep 
structures of meaning matter, such that the ideas at the foundations of our understanding 
of the economic world continue, which is why neoliberalism has remained resilient up 
until recently (Schmidt and Thatcher 2013; Schmidt 2016). Since Donald Trump’s 
election, however, these ideas have been subject to increasing contestation, as new 
rhetorical strategies using uncivil language and the new social media in a “post-truth” 
environment have served to reshape the political landscape by framing debates in ways 
that challenge conventional political discourse and action (Schmidt 2017). 
 
The Power of Ideas: Real Differences between Post-Structuralism and  
Discursive Institutionalism 
If I have successfully demonstrated that discursive institutionalism is constructivist with a 
subjective and intersubjective approach to contextualized meaning, then how, one might 
ask, does it differ from post-structuralism? And, leaving aside Larsson’s misreadings of 
discursive institutionalism, why might we agree with his counsel to other post-
structuralists to be careful when attempting to merge approaches? The reasons are found 
in the different ways in which the two approaches conceive of the nature of power and its 
relationship to ideas. 
 Many of the approaches that generally fit under the discursive institutionalist 
umbrella do not theorize power, but instead simply state that ideas have power (e.g., 
Blyth 2002; Campbell 1998; Cox 2001; Kingdon 1984). The problem here, as a result, is 
that with few exceptions (notably Béland 2010), the matter of how ideas have power 
remains under-theorized and under-investigated.   
 Post-structuralists such as Foucault (2000), Gramsci (1971), and Laclau and 
Mouffe (1985), instead, put power at the center of their understanding of ideas, be it as 
discursive formations, hegemony, ideology, or the production of subjectivity. The 
problem here is that power and discourse are so often intermingled that any empirical 
discourse analysis is imbued with the theoretical focus on domination by elites, such that 
investigation centers on how elite ideas control the ways in which people come to think 
about politics and society. For political scientists who do not start with these premises 
(although they might end with them as conclusions), embedding substantive theory about 
power relations in the methodology risks over-determining the results. 
 Lately, in conjunction with Martin Carstensen, I have developed a systematic 
theorization of constructivist ideas about ideational power that seeks to set these 
approaches, among others, in perspective (Carstensen and Schmidt 2016). Drawing on 
both existing ideational scholarship and the larger power debate in political science 
(focused mainly on coercive, structural, and institutional power), we define ideational 
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power as the capacity of actors (whether individual or collective) to influence other actors’ 
normative and cognitive beliefs through the use of ideational elements. We note that acts 
of ideational power—whether successful or not—occur in only a subset of the relations 
relevant for understanding how ideas matter, namely when actors seek to influence the 
beliefs of others by promoting their own ideas at the expense of others’.  
 In this view, ideational power has certain distinguishing features. First, it is 
exerted through the constitution of intersubjective meaning structures that agents both 
draw on, to give meaning to their material and social circumstances, and battle over, to 
affect which ideas and discourses are deemed viable. Second, ideational power is 
conceived as both a top-down and a bottom-up process. That is, ideational power takes 
seriously not only the discursive struggles occurring among policy actors at the top of the 
power hierarchy, but also those related to the effort of political actors at the bottom to get 
their ideas across to the general public. This contrasts with the singular focus on top-
down interaction generally characterizing the coercive, structural, and institutional 
understandings of power in ideationally insensitive political science (Carstensen and 
Schmidt 2016, 321-22). 
 With this in mind, we have identified three ways of theorizing about the power of 
ideas and discourse. These include looking for persuasive power through ideas via 
discourse, looking for coercive power over ideas and discourse, and looking for structural 
or institutional power in ideas and discourse.  
 Power through ideas is the most common approach to ideational power among 
discursive institutionalists. It consists of the capacity of actors to persuade other actors of 
the cognitive validity and/or normative value of their views of what they should think and 
do through the use of ideational elements. They tend to do this via discourses that serve 
to explain and/or legitimate their proposals and actions, whether in coordination with 
other policy actors (coordinative discourse) or in communication with the public 
(communicative discourse). This is not necessarily a completely “rational” process in the 
sense that the most powerful necessarily are the ones with the “best” argument. Instead, 
the persuasiveness of an idea depends on both the cognitive and normative arguments 
that can be mustered in its support.  In this view, ideational power is not primarily about 
manipulating people into not recognizing their “real interests” (Lukes 1974), but rather 
about persuading other agents about one’s understanding of an issue based on available 
intersubjectively held ideas (Carstensen and Schmidt 2016, 323-26). 
 Power over ideas is the capacity of actors to control and dominate the meaning of 
ideas either directly, by imposing their ideas on others, or indirectly, whether through 
shaming opponents into conformity or by resisting alternative interpretations. This 
version of ideational power connects with more coercive forms of power, since here the 
beliefs of others are directly disregarded. It is the most common approach to ideational 
power taken by ideationally insensitive scholars, who see this power as the capacity of 
actors who control most of the levers of traditional power—coercive, structural, and/or 
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institutional—to therefore also promote their own ideas to the exclusion of all others.  
However, power over ideas can alternatively be seen as the coercive power of actors who 
are usually powerless in the sense that they enjoy little access to coercive, institutional, 
and structural forms of power, but who, by the use of discursive means, are able to shame 
otherwise powerful actors to act in ways they would not otherwise have done—as in the 
case of progressive social movements. Finally, power over ideas can manifest itself in the 
ability of actors who are normally quite powerful in terms of institutional position and 
authority to, themselves, not listen to alternative ideas—as with many economists in the 
neoliberal era (Carstensen and Schmidt 2016, 326-28). 
 Power in ideas focuses on the authority certain ideas enjoy in structuring thought 
at the expense of other ideas. This power can be seen as structural or institutional. 
Structural power in ideas results from agents having established hegemony over the 
production of subject positions, and is generally the focus of post-structuralists. 
Institutional power in ideas is a consequence of institutions imposing constraints on 
which ideas agents may take into consideration, and is mostly the domain of historical 
institutionalists. While the other forms of ideational power generally concentrate on the 
interactions between ideational agents, power in ideas mostly concerns the deeper-level 
ideational and institutional structures that actors draw upon and relate their ideas to in 
order for them to gain recognition from elites and the mass public (Carstensen and 
Schmidt 2016, 329-331).    
What is particularly interesting about power in ideas is that it can be seen as even 
more “powerful” in some sense than coercive or structural power. While coercive power 
forces agents to do what they might not want to do, agents may at least be aware of this 
domination, like it or not. In the case of Foucault’s structuring ideas, by contrast, the 
ideational structure dominates not just what agents do but also what they think and say, 
while for Bourdieu (1994), the doxa or vision of the world of elites who dominate the 
state creates the habitus that conditions people to see the world in the way they (the 
dominant) choose (Carstensen and Schmidt 2016, 331).   
 Ironically, however, one could also argue that Foucault and Bourdieu themselves 
use power through ideas to make others aware of the underlying structuring power of the 
discourse or habitus of people’s everyday lives. As such, their work uses the “foreground 
discursive abilities” noted above to step outside the doxa or discourse by means of their 
own writings, and through interactive discourse and debate to encourage others to reason, 
argue, and change the structures they use. Gramsci (1971) makes this explicit when he 
emphasizes the role of intellectuals in breaking the hegemonic discourse. But beyond 
even Gramsci, it is necessary to point to the importance of public debates in democratic 
societies in serving to expose the power in ideas that serve as vehicles for elite 
domination and power. Significantly, Foucault’s own work has often been used in the 
social movement literature to demonstrate how NGOs’ power through ideas, to persuade 
first other activists and then the general public of the cognitive validity and normative 
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value of their views, has become not only power over ideas, by forcing political leaders 
to accept such views, like it or not, but also power in ideas, as these ideas then come to 
structure subsequent thought. A perfect example of this triple power of ideas is Epstein’s 
(2008) case study of the shift social movements effected in the discourse on whaling. 
Activism that convinced the larger public to change its ideas (power through ideas) about 
whales and whaling moved the discourse on killer whales from creatures that could and 
should themselves be killed, as in “Moby Dick” (power in ideas), to “Moby Doll” and a 
total interdiction on killing whales (power in other ideas), which in turn served to shame 
governments in the international arena (power over ideas) to change their discourse and 
rules. 
 
   *   *   * 
 
 
In conclusion, let me reiterate that discursive institutionalism is an umbrella concept that 
constitutes a wide field, with many different approaches to ideas and discourse. It can 
accommodate all three forms of ideational power, including my own particular focus on 
persuasive power through ideas and Larsson’s on post-structuralist power in ideas. These 
are admittedly important differences, which are accompanied by other subtle differences 
in ontology and epistemology that push post-structuralists to investigate questions related 
to the deepest structures of meaning while discursive institutionalists explore a wider 
range of questions that go from ideas through discursive interactions in institutional 
context. But rather than seeing these differences as so irreconcilable as to warrant the 
exclusion of one or the other approach, I prefer continued engagement, mutual learning, 
and friendly contestation as the pathway forward. 
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